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Abstract
Research summary: We investigate the role of a firm's
dividend and growth reputations in shaping investors'
interpretations of acquisitions as a negative or positive
expectation violation. While our findings reveal that
both an acquiring firm's dividend and growth reputa-
tions trigger positive investor reactions, they also show
that investors react negatively to an acquisition of a tar-
get firm with a strong growth reputation when the
acquiring firm has a strong dividend reputation. We
also find that investors are inclined to give managers
“the benefit of the doubt” to the extent that an acquir-
ing firm strategically frames an acquisition announce-
ment in such a way that it provides assurance to
investors that the acquisition is meant to exceed inves-
tors' expectations about shareholder value creation.
Managerial summary: We study why investors
respond to some acquisitions positively and others neg-
atively. We find that the way acquiring and target firms
have created shareholder value in the past, and the
information conveyed in the acquisition announce-
ments are important determinants of investors'
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differential reactions to acquisitions. Our findings show
that while investors generally react positively to acqui-
sitions by firms known for creating value either
through dividends or growth, their reactions become
negative when a firm known for value creation through
dividends acquires a target known for value creation
through growth. We further find that managers can
favorably influence investor reactions by making it
salient in the acquisition announcement how the acqui-
sition is intended to exceed investors' value creation
expectations from the acquiring firm.
KEYWORD S
acquisition announcements, expectancy violation theory, framing,
investor reactions, mergers and acquisitions, reputation
1 | INTRODUCTION
Global acquisition activity continues to surge, and in 2019 alone firms spent $4.1 trillion on
acquisitions (Dealogic, 2020). Although acquisitions are intended to create value, investors typi-
cally react negatively to acquisition announcements (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara,
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Drawing on the expectancy violation theory (EVT), Graffin,
Haleblian, and Kiley (2016) explain such reactions by investors' interpretations of acquisitions
as a violation of their expectations regarding how firms should behave to create value. Given
the widespread observation that most acquisitions fail to reach their objectives (e.g., Haleblian
et al., 2009), it is plausible that investors are skeptical about the value-creation potential of
acquisitions. However, these insights do not readily explain why investors evaluate some acqui-
sitions positively (Campbell, Sirmon, & Schijven, 2016). Interestingly, the positive reactions of
investors to acquisitions imply that they perceive specific acquisitions from a subset of firms to
be compatible with how they expect these firms to create value. However, we know little about
how and under what circumstances the varied expectations of investors about acquiring firms
influence when they perceive acquisitions to be a good or a bad deal.
One key explanation for investors' varied reactions to acquisitions is acquiring firms' reputa-
tion for creating shareholder value. These reputations shape investors' expectations of acquiring
firms, influencing how they interpret an acquisition and react to it (Haleblian, Pfarrer, &
Kiley, 2017). Scholars have argued that investors tend to punish high-reputation firms more
severely for making acquisitions (Haleblian et al., 2017), because acquisitions are not generally
perceived to be conducive to value creation (Graffin et al., 2016). However, firms can create
shareholder value in multiple ways (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2014). Firms can thus develop dis-
tinct reputations originating from specific ways of creating shareholder value, which may give
rise to different expectations (Mishina, Block, & Mannor, 2012; Parker, Krause, &
Devers, 2019). Some of these expectations may provide firms with a greater leeway to pursue
specific strategic actions, such as acquisitions, to fulfill investors' expectations (e.g., Pfarrer,
Pollock, & Rindova, 2010; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005; Zavyalova, Pfarrer,
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Reger, & Hubbard, 2016). Therefore, even though investors may remain largely skeptical about
the value-creation potential of acquisitions, we suggest that they might react differently to
acquisitions, depending on acquiring firms' distinct reputation for creating shareholder value.
By bringing together recent advances in research on reputation, EVT, and impression manage-
ment, we develop a contingency model explaining underlying reasons and consequences for
varied expectations of investors about a firm's acquisition behavior. In so doing, we extent the
literature in at least two important ways.
First, with few exceptions (e.g., Boivie, Graffin, & Gentry, 2016; Lange, Lee, & Dai, 2011;
Rindova et al., 2005), prior research has conceptualized a firm's reputation for value creation along
a single dimension (Haleblian et al., 2017). Moving beyond this research, our framework builds on
the notion that a firm can develop a reputation by being known for distinct ways of creating value
(Lange et al., 2011), and suggests that firms may create shareholder value either by delivering
growth or by paying out dividends (Brealey et al., 2014). Those firms that consistently deliver
growth over time develop a growth reputation while those that consistently pay out dividends
develop a dividend reputation (Parker et al., 2019). When a firm has a growth reputation, we argue
that investors will perceive that its acquisition behavior will enable the firm to exceed their value-
creation expectations, due to the anticipated contribution of acquisitions to accelerate future
growth. Conversely, when a firm has a dividend reputation, investors will perceive its acquisition
behavior to be falling short of their expectations, because it may compromise the ability of the firm
to maintain dividend payments. By allowing investor expectations to vary depending on acquiring
firms' dividend or growth reputations, our framework explains when investors will react more or
less favorably to an acquisition announcement. Our theorizing thus demonstrates the underex-
ploited application of EVT's full spectrum of predictions, which allow acquisitions to be interpreted
not only as negative but also as positive expectancy violations.
Second, building on the notion that investors seek additional sources of information when mak-
ing sense of a perceived expectancy violation (Burgoon, 1993), our framework examines how sub-
stantive and symbolic information cues further shape the interpretative processes of investors when
evaluating an acquisition. Whereas substantive cues refer to information regarding the nature of a
firm's actions, symbolic information cues refer to firms' use of impression management to convey
how managers intend to fulfill stakeholders' expectations (Cuypers, Koh, & Wang, 2016; Fiss &
Zajac, 2004, 2006). Although scholars have shown that investors consider both types of cues when
assessing expectancy violations (e.g., Elsbach, 1994; Gomulya & Mishina, 2017), we know very little
about how substantive and symbolic cues may shape investors' interpretative processes and their
subsequent reactions in different ways. Earlier research in this area has not only focused almost
exclusively on the role of symbolic cues (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Graffin et al., 2016; Rhee & Fiss, 2014;
Zavyalova, Pfarrer, Reger, & Shapiro, 2012), it has also investigated reactions to negative expectancy
violations in isolation. We provide a more comprehensive approach and show how investors' initial
perceptions of an acquisition as a negative or a positive expectancy violation are shaped by substan-
tive and symbolic information cues. In so doing, we develop a framework which identifies impor-
tant boundary conditions of EVT and offers novel insights about why investors' observed reactions
do not consistently follow EVT's predictions.
Our analysis of 462 acquisitions by 227 S&P 500 firms largely supports our predictions. We
find that an acquirer's dividend and growth reputations both trigger favorable reactions from
investors, yet the positive effect of firms' growth reputation on investor reactions is much more
precisely estimated than that of the dividend reputation. We further reveal that when an acquir-
ing firm has a dividend reputation, investors react unfavorably when a firm with a growth repu-
tation is targeted for acquisition. Finally, firms elicit more favorable reactions by framing
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acquisition announcements to assure investors that the acquisition is meant to exceed investors'
expectations about particulars ways of creating shareholder value.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Investors' reactions to acquisitions through the lens of EVT
Research on acquisitions has recently focused on examining the cognitive underpinnings of inves-
tors' evaluations of acquisitions through the lens of EVT (Graffin et al., 2016; Haleblian et al., 2017).
EVT suggests that decision makers hold expectations of firms regarding how they should behave,
and that they evaluate firms' actions in light of these expectations (Burgoon, 1993). Behaviors whose
consequences are anticipated to exceed expectations are perceived as positive expectancy violations
and are rewarded, whereas those whose consequences are anticipated to fall short of expectations
are perceived as negative expectancy violations and are punished.
Research suggests that investors mostly react negatively to acquisition announcements
(Haleblian et al., 2009), implying that they view acquisitions as failing to meet their expectations for
value creation (Graffin et al., 2016). Acquisitions are indeed complex activities with often ambiguous
motives whose synergetic potential is virtually impossible to determine in advance (Gamache
et al., 2019). Nevertheless, investors evaluate some acquisitions positively (Campbell et al., 2016),
implying that a subset of firms are perceived to exceed investors' expectations for value creation by
making acquisitions. Although EVT may be applied to explain both unfavorable and favorable
responses to organizational events, scholars have so far only invoked the theory to explain investors'
negative reactions to acquisitions. Thus, both theoretical insights and empirical evidence are limited
regarding the specific nature of investors' value-creation expectations, and how these may lead them
to evaluate a given acquisition positively or negatively.
2.2 | Firm reputation and investors' value-creation expectations
A firm's reputation is widely established as an important determinant of stakeholders' expectations
regarding a firm's future behavior (Pfarrer et al., 2010; Zavyalova et al., 2016). When a firm estab-
lishes a reputation by consistently delivering a valued outcome, stakeholders develop expectations
that this outcome will continue (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Fasaei,
Tempelaar, & Jansen, 2018; Parker et al., 2019). In this sense, a firm's reputation constitutes an
interpretative scheme for stakeholders, based on which investors evaluate firm behaviors regarding
their perceived likelihood of contributing to expected outcomes (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Following
Haleblian et al. (2017), and consistent with the view of a firm's reputation as a reflection of its past
actions and outcomes (Basdeo et al., 2006), we conceptualize a firm's reputation as a consistent
track record of creating value for a specific group of stakeholders, investors.1 Although Haleblian
et al. (2017) have defined a firm's reputation as being known for creating shareholder value in
1In their review of research on organizational reputation, Lange et al. (2011, p. 155) note that management scholars
have conceptualized reputation in three different ways: “being known (generalized awareness or visibility of the firm;
prominence of the firm in the collective perception), being known for something (perceived predictability of
organizational outcomes and behavior relevant to specific audience interests), and generalized favorability (perceptions
or judgments of the overall organization as good, attractive, and appropriate).” Our conceptualization of reputation
corresponds to “being known for something.”
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general, our conceptualization suggests that firms may be known for a particular way of doing so
(Mishina et al., 2012; Parker et al., 2019). More specifically, we argue that firms may create share-
holder value either by delivering better-than-average growth and/or by paying dividends (Brealey
et al., 2014). By doing so consistently over time, firms develop a growth and/or dividend reputation,
respectively (Aghion & Stein, 2008; Benner, 2007).
We argue that these distinct types of reputations give rise to varied investor expectations
regarding the type of strategic activities that a firm should undertake (Parker et al., 2019). For
instance, once a firm initiates a dividend payment, it implicitly commits to maintaining or
increasing it in the future, because failure to do so is punished by investors (Brav, Graham,
Harvey, & Michaely, 2005). Since a firm's ability to pay dividends hinges on its profitability,
investors evaluate the actions of firms with a dividend reputation based on their anticipated
impact on future profitability (Benner & Ranganathan, 2013). For such firms, therefore, strate-
gic actions that are anticipated to enhance or reduce profits are perceived respectively by inves-
tors as positive or negative expectancy violations. Conversely, when a firm has a growth
reputation, investors are particularly sensitive to potential declines in future growth prospects
(Kim, Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 2011; Pfarrer et al., 2010) and evaluate the firm's actions based
on their likely impact on future growth (Benner & Ranganathan, 2013). Thus, actions that are
anticipated to strengthen the firm's ability to seize new growth opportunities are perceived as
positive expectancy violations, while those that will curb growth are perceived as negative
violations.
Scholars have argued that firms can hold multiple reputations (Parker et al., 2019). Anec-
dotal evidence indicates that firms may pursue strategies that help them develop both dividend
and growth reputations. For example, in 2016 prominent firms such as 3 M, Johnson &
Johnson, Leggett & Platt, and Sysco not only increased their dividend payouts but also gener-
ated higher-than-average growth compared to their peers, and explicitly communicated their
commitment to both increasing dividends and achieving growth. For example, Leggett & Platt
stressed in their 2015 annual letter to the shareholders that “…we have also been achieving
better-than-market growth in several lines of business… We increased our annual dividend for
the 43rd consecutive year, a record we plan to extend.” Building on these insights, we next
examine separately how investors' perceptions of acquisitions are shaped by the dividend and
growth reputations of an acquiring firm.
2.3 | Acquirer's dividend and growth reputation and investors'
reactions to acquisitions
We expect investors to perceive an acquisition by a firm with a dividend reputation as a nega-
tive expectancy violation because of two reasons. First, investors expect from firms with a divi-
dend reputation to prioritize dividend payments over other strategic initiatives, and to refrain
from actions that might jeopardize their profitability (Brav et al., 2005). Acquisitions, however,
absorb firm resources that could otherwise be used to improve short-term profitability, for
example by improving operational margins. In addition, although acquisitions require substan-
tial investments in the short run such as for acquisition premiums and integration, any eventual
gains usually materialize only in the long run. Thus, if a firm diverts its resources away from
improving short-term profits, and at the same time makes an immediate increase in capital
spending, this is likely to cause concerns among its investors that the firm might be sacrificing
dividend payments in order to prioritize longer-term goals.
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Second, a firm's dividend reputation prompts investors to prioritize a steady stream of dividend
payments over potentially higher yet more uncertain gains (Graham & Kumar, 2006; Tihanyi,
Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). Investors appreciate firms with a dividend reputation because
they offer the opportunity of increased dividends in the future without any threat of dividend cuts
(Devers, Wiseman, & Holmes, 2007). Because of their risk aversion, these investors expect a firm to
focus on improving efficiency without increasing its exposure to risky and ambiguous situations.
However, potential gains from acquisitions in terms of operational synergies are often highly uncer-
tain and fail to materialize (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Cording, Christmann, & King, 2008). As a
consequence, a firm with a dividend reputation may be perceived by investors as failing to meet
their value-creation expectations by making an acquisition. We thus argue that investors react nega-
tively to an acquisition announcement, as evidenced by lower abnormal stock returns, to the extent
that an acquirer has a dividend reputation.
Hypothesis (H1a) The strength of the acquirer's dividend reputation is negatively associated
with the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition announcement.
Conversely, we expect investors to perceive acquisitions as positive expectancy violations to the
extent that the acquiring firms hold a growth reputation. There are at least two reasons for this.
First, investors of firms with a growth reputation prefer strategies to accelerate growth by
pioneering new technologies, disrupting current markets or exploring nascent areas
(Benner, 2007; Chan & Lakonishok, 2004). Acquisitions are widely perceived as conduits for
rapid growth (Kim et al., 2011; McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008; Villalonga &
McGahan, 2005) as they allow firms to expand into new markets or to improve their market
share in existing markets more rapidly than internal efforts (Lee & Lieberman, 2010). Moreover,
acquisitions also enable access to new technologies that may help an acquirer to accelerate its
growth (Ahuja & Katila, 2001; Kapoor & Lim, 2007). Therefore, investors of firms with a growth
reputation are likely to perceive acquisitions as appropriate vehicles that may enable these firms
to exceed their future growth expectations.
Second, a firm with a growth reputation has demonstrated better-than-average capital gains in
the past and its investors may be willing to take risks to realize similar or even higher returns in the
future (Pfarrer et al., 2010). Even though investors may understand that an acquisition is not with-
out risks and costs (Baik, Farber, & Petroni, 2009; Benner & Ranganathan, 2013), they may react to
it positively because they consider such bold competitive moves to be vital for increasing market
power, expanding market share, and achieving superior growth rates. Therefore, because acquisi-
tions are seen as conduits for accelerating growth, which induce positive sentiments about risky yet
aggressive moves to create superior shareholder value, we suggest that investors will react more
favorably to an acquisition made by a firm with a growth reputation.
Hypothesis (H1b) The strength of the acquirer's growth reputation is positively associated with
the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition announcement.
2.4 | The role of substantive and symbolic information in shaping
perceptions of expectancy violations
EVT suggests that perceived expectancy violations trigger an evaluation process whereby deci-
sion makers try to make sense of the event causing the violation (Burgoon, 1993). Since there is
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no causal explanation for unexpected events, decision makers seek additional information to
make sense of such events (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Given that an acquisition may be
perceived as a negative or a positive expectation violation, we argue that investors rely on addi-
tional sources of information that could help them to reinforce or revise their initial perceptions
of whether the acquisition will enable the firm to fulfill their expectations, or prevent it from
doing so.
Research in management shows that, when evaluating organizational events, stakeholders
use substantive as well as symbolic information cues (Cuypers et al., 2016; Goffman, 1974;
Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Substantive information cues refer to information regarding a firm's
actions that require the use of firm resources. Since substantive cues constitute tangible and
observable evidence of how a firm deploys its resources (Fiss & Zajac, 2006), they provide
insights to stakeholders about the extent to which a firm is able to meet or exceed their expecta-
tions (Cuypers et al., 2016). Symbolic information cues refer to signals that convey how man-
agers intend to fulfill stakeholders' expectations (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). Specifically, symbolic cues
refer to a firm's use of impression management to convey information about how its actions are
intended to serve stakeholder interests (Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Goffman, 1974). While sym-
bolic cues do not constitute tangible evidence and may be based on “mere talk,” they reduce
the uncertainty regarding the managerial motives behind a firm's actions, and mitigate con-
cerns about the alignment between the interests of the firm and those of its stakeholders
(Westphal & Zajac, 1998).
2.5 | Acquirer's reputations, target's reputations, and investors'
reactions to acquisitions
Because the acquisition of a particular target firm involves the utilization of financial and man-
agerial resources to internalize new capabilities, it represents a resource deployment choice by
the acquiring firm (e.g., Capron & Mitchell, 2009). Thus, the organizational capabilities of the
target firm, as reflected in its reputation for value creation, may be used by investors as substan-
tive information cues to make sense of why the acquirer is engaging in a specific acquisition.
Such sense-making efforts could enable investors to feel more confident in assessing whether
the acquirer's intentions represent a divergence from their expectations. For instance, while the
acquisition of a target firm with a growth reputation may be interpreted as an attempt to
enhance future growth, the acquisition of a target firm with a dividend reputation may be per-
ceived as a desire to improve cash flows.
Although a target firm's dividend and growth reputations may both be considered relevant
substantive cues for investors, research in social psychology suggests that when seeking new
information to make sense of a perceived expectancy violation, people tend to prioritize infor-
mation that supports their initial interpretation of an event, that is, the confirmation bias
(Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). Confirmation bias arises because people
want to avoid negative consequences associated with an erroneous initial evaluation
(Nickerson, 1998; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987). We therefore argue that when investors per-
ceive an acquisition as a negative expectancy violation, they focus selectively on information
about the target firm's reputation confirming their initial interpretation that the acquirer is fail-
ing to meet their expectations. Similarly, when investors perceive an acquisition as a positive
expectancy violation, they focus selectively on information about the target firm's reputation
confirming their initial interpretation that the acquirer is exceeding their expectations.
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We therefore predict that investors will focus exclusively on the target firm's growth reputation
when making sense of an acquisition because, depending on the acquirer's reputation, it may
serve as confirmatory evidence for their initial evaluation of an acquisition as either a negative
or a positive expectancy violation.
We argue that when investors observe that an acquirer with a dividend reputation has
selected a target with a growth reputation, this amplifies their initial concerns about the
acquirer's ability to maintain dividend payments in the future. First, the acquisition of a target
with a growth reputation implies that the acquiring firm is internalizing new capabilities geared
towards expanding into new markets or improving market share in existing markets. While
such strategic moves may improve the acquiring firm's competitiveness in the long term, they
are unlikely to increase profitability in the short term. This may lead profit-maximizing inves-
tors to be concerned that the postacquisition strain on short-term profitability is likely to be
even greater than initially anticipated. Specifically, investors may perceive that short-term prof-
itability is likely to be compromised not only by the acquisition costs but also by the growth-
oriented strategic actions that the acquiring firm is likely to take following the acquisition.
Second, the growth reputation of a target may signal to investors that the acquirer intends to
shift its strategic priorities from increasing dividend payments to accelerating growth. Such a
perception will heighten investors' initial concerns that potential postacquisition earnings will
be allocated to more risky endeavors such as entering new markets, rather than paying divi-
dends. Consequently, we argue that, for investors of an acquiring firm with a dividend reputa-
tion, a target firm's growth reputation will intensify their initial evaluation that their
expectations are being negatively violated.
Hypothesis (H2a) A target firm's growth reputation will strengthen the negative association
between the acquirer's dividend reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with
an acquisition announcement.
Extending our argument that a firm's growth reputation leads investors to perceive its acquisi-
tions as positive expectancy violations, we suggest that investors will focus selectively on the
growth reputation of the target firm when evaluating an acquisition. That is because a substan-
tive information cue of this kind constitutes evidence to confirm investors' initial perceptions
that the acquisition is an attempt to exceed their expectations regarding future growth. First,
the internalization of growth-oriented capabilities, as implied by the growth reputation of the
target firm, will strengthen investors' perceptions that the acquirer is expanding its growth-
oriented capabilities. This, in turn, is likely to be perceived as a signal that the firm takes its
ambition to accelerate growth seriously. Such signaling reinforces the investors' perceptions
that the firm is committed to pursuing value creation through growth. Second, although the
acquisition of a high-growth target is a riskier strategic move, it also promises a higher potential
payoff than pursuing growth organically (Kim et al., 2011). The acquisition of a high-growth
target therefore demonstrates the acquirer's willingness to embrace high-risk strategies in order
to go above and beyond what might be expected by investors to deliver shareholder value. This
in turn amplifies the positive investor sentiments induced by the acquisition and leads to even
higher abnormal returns.
Hypothesis (H2b) A target firm's growth reputation will strengthen the positive association
between the acquirer's growth reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with an
acquisition announcement.
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2.6 | Acquirer's reputation, strategic framing, and investors' reactions
to acquisitions
Strategic framing refers to purposeful use of impression management by firms to shape audi-
ences' interpretations of a situation more favorably by making specific aspects of reality more
salient (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Giorgi, 2017; Goffman, 1974; Rhee & Fiss, 2014). Strategic framing is
a sense-giving attempt by managers to explain to investors how the acquisition is intended to
fulfill stakeholders' expectations. It thus constitutes an important symbolic information cue that
investors may use to supplement their sense making about the acquisition. Acquisition
announcements are the primary means through which managers communicate their views
about an acquisition to investors. By making particular aspects of an acquisition more salient
through framing in the acquisition announcement (Goffman, 1974), managers may align inves-
tors' sense making more closely with their own view of how the acquisition is intended to gen-
erate outcomes that exceed the investors' expectations.
Although we suggested that investors are susceptible to confirmation bias when processing
substantive information cues, we argue that this bias has a weaker effect when they are
processing symbolic information cues. There is less likelihood of confirmation bias when people
lack confidence in their initial evaluation of a situation (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, &
Moscovici, 2000; Yin, Mitra, & Zhang, 2016). Investors usually possess more restricted informa-
tion compared to managers regarding underlying motives of an acquisition and its potential to
realize synergistic gains (Schijven & Hitt, 2012). This information asymmetry reduces investors'
confidence in evaluating the potential consequences of an acquisition for their expectations
from the acquiring firm, and motivates them to “focus on signals that can serve as a proxy for
management's informed perception of the focal acquisition's synergistic potential” (Schijven &
Hitt, 2012, p. 1251). Thus, reduced confidence in their own sense making of acquisitions may
make investors willing to embrace managers' sense giving regarding the intentions behind the
acquisitions and their likely consequences, even when these do not confirm investors' initial
interpretations.
The different expectations of investors from acquirers with a dividend or growth reputation
makes them sensitive to information in an acquisition announcement that highlights particular
aspects of the acquisition that are relevant to dividend payments or growth. Thus, through
framing, acquirers with a dividend reputation may offset investors' concerns that the acquisition
will have a negative impact on dividend payments. Similarly, acquirers with a growth reputa-
tion may reinforce investors' interpretations of an acquisition as a strategic move enabling the
firms to exceed their expectations about future growth.
Dividend framing refers to providing information in an acquisition announcement regard-
ing how the acquisition is intended to enhance current and future dividend payments. We sug-
gest that the use of dividend framing by acquirers with a dividend reputation can help mitigate
the extent to which investors perceive an acquisition as a negative expectancy violation. Indeed,
many acquisitions are made to improve margins through consolidation efforts and operational
synergies (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991; Walter & Barney, 1990). Others are initi-
ated to reduce risks by diversifying cash flow streams or gaining access to capital markets
(Rabier, 2017). Highlighting such motives in an acquisition announcement may attenuate
investors' concerns that the acquisition will put a strain on short-term profitability. Further-
more, providing explicit information about how the acquisition is intended to improve or main-
tain future profitability may reduce investors' uncertainty regarding the consequences of the
acquisition. In sum, we argue that, by using dividend framing in an acquisition announcement,
BLAGOEVA ET AL. 9
an acquiring firm may encourage investors to embrace the importance and usefulness of the
acquisition, despite its dividend reputation. This may then lead investors to revise their initial
interpretations that the acquiring firm is committing a negative expectancy violation.
Hypothesis (H3a) Dividend framing will weaken the negative association between the acquirer's
dividend reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition
announcement.
Growth framing refers to providing information in an acquisition announcement regarding
how the acquisition is intended to accelerate future growth, for example, by expanding innova-
tion capabilities, disrupting current markets or exploring new markets (Benner, 2007; Chan &
Lakonishok, 2004). Although we have suggested that an acquirer's growth reputation will lead
investors to evaluate acquisitions favorably, managers could use the opportunity to manage
investors' expectations upwards in terms of the growth-creating potential of an acquisition. Spe-
cifically, managers could present the acquisition as a critical and nonsubstitutable element for
their growth aspirations and their vision of rapid expansion. Indeed, managers could justify
diverting scarce managerial attention away from alternative growth opportunities (Graham,
Harvey, & Puri, 2015) by presenting the acquisition as a unique opportunity to take a big leap
forward—for example, by establishing first-mover advantages, which would not have been pos-
sible by other means (Kim et al., 2011). Such interpretations of the acquisition cast it in a new
and more positive light, presenting it as a means to exceed investors' expectations to an even
greater extent.
Including in the acquisition announcement specific information about the necessary risk of
making the acquisition could also boost investors' enthusiasm and help them to see the acquisi-
tion in a different light, as having a strategic intent that may exceed their expectations. For
instance, stressing the innovative nature of the target firm and its potential to pioneer new mar-
kets rapidly could shape investors' perceptions of the necessity and urgency of engaging in a
risky acquisition. Such growth ambitions might have been insufficiently appreciated by inves-
tors without the managers explaining this explicitly by the growth framing in the acquisition
announcements. Growth framing therefore strengthens the investors' perceptions of the firm's
commitment to pursuing value creation through growth, and this will heighten the positive sen-
timents induced by the acquisition.
Hypothesis (H3b) Growth framing will strengthen the positive association between the acquirer's
growth reputation and the abnormal stock returns associated with an acquisition
announcement.
3 | METHODS
3.1 | Sample and data sources
We tested our hypotheses using a sample of acquisitions completed by S&P 500 firms between
2000 and 2015, all of which involved 100% ownership. We collected data relating to deals,
acquirers, and targets from the SDC Platinum database. We used Compustat to obtain industry-
related data as well as the financial ratios used to compute the strength of the acquirer's and
the target's dividend and growth reputations. Following earlier research, we used Fortune
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magazine and the Wall Street Journal to gather data on the acquirer's general reputation. We
obtained stock price data from the CRSP database to construct our dependent variable. We col-
lected acquisition announcements manually from Factiva, LexisNexis and the websites of the
acquiring firms. Data on investor sentiment was obtained from http://www.stern.nyu.edu/
~jwurgler. After excluding observations with missing data, our final sample consisted of
462 acquisitions announced by 227 unique acquirers.
3.2 | Dependent variable
3.2.1 | Abnormal stock returns
We measured our dependent variable using cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) associated
with an acquisition announcement and used the standard event study methodology (Haleblian
et al., 2009). CAR represent unanticipated returns to a stock resulting from a certain event—in
this case an acquisition. To calculate CAR, we first estimated the following asset-pricing model
using historical data from a 250-day period preceding an acquisition announcement:
rit=αi+βrmt+εit
Here, rit denoted returns for firm i on day t, rmt denoted corresponding daily returns on the
CRSP value-weighted index, and εit was distributed i.i.d. We then used the estimates from the
asset-pricing model to calculate predicted returns over a 3-day period around the acquisition
announcement date (−1, 1), that is, the “event window.” Using a short event window mitigated
the risk of including confounding events within the event window (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
Next, we calculated abnormal returns within the event window by subtracting the predicted
returns from the actual returns. Finally, we calculated CAR as the sum of abnormal returns
within the event window. We also tested our results with alternative event windows, for exam-
ple, (−2, 2) and (0, 1), and found that they remained largely consistent.
3.3 | Explanatory variables
3.3.1 | Dividend and growth reputation of the acquirer and the
target firm
We measured the strength of the dividend and growth reputations using observable financial
indicators. While a firm's reputations such as its dividend and growth reputation represent an
intangible asset (Parker et al., 2019), they are rooted in investors' cautious and analytical evalua-
tions of a firm's prior track record and its observable strategic choices (Basdeo et al., 2006; Rav-
asi, Rindova, Etter, & Cornelissen, 2018). That is, a reputation originates from the extrapolation
of observations from the recent past through which investors develop their perceptions and
expectations of a firm (Chan & Lakonishok, 2004; Mishina et al., 2012), and managers seek to
ensure that observable financial indicators remain path dependent to signal a commitment to a
particular means of creating value (Brav et al., 2005). Therefore, past values of financial indica-
tors pertaining to value creation through the payment of dividends and achieving growth
constitute appropriate proxies for a firm's dividend and growth reputation, respectively.
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We measured the strength of an acquirer's or a target's dividend reputation by their dividends
per share (DPS) paid in the year prior to a focal acquisition. DPS has been shown to provide the
clearest indication to investors about a firm's commitment to dividend payments (Brav
et al., 2005). We measured the strength of an acquirer's or target's growth reputation by their
sales growth over 3 years preceding the year of a focal acquisition.
3.3.2 | Dividend and growth framing
Dividend and growth framing measure the degree to which the information released in acquisi-
tion announcements pertains to how a focal acquisition is intended to enhance dividend pay-
ments and future growth, respectively. To measure the extent of dividend framing and growth
framing used by acquirers, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of the acquisition
announcements in our sample. Content analysis is an appropriate technique for capturing stra-
tegic framing targeted at investors (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). To measure both types of strategic fram-
ing, we first developed dividend and growth dictionaries that included specific words that could
be interpreted by investors as related to ensuring dividend payments or realizing future growth.
Our dividend dictionary consisted of the words dividend, safe, stable, maintain, cash flow,
steady, and all of their forms and derivatives. Our growth dictionary consisted of the words
grow, expand, innovate, rise, pioneer, dynamic, rapid, fast, and all of their forms and derivatives.
For example, forms and derivatives of the word “grow” that were also included in our growth
dictionary were “growing,” “growth,” “grows,” and so forth. Then, we calculated the percentage
of “dividend words” and “growth words” in each acquisition announcement. Thus:
Dividend framing = (number of “dividend words” in the acquisition announcement/total
number of words in the acquisition announcement) × 100.
Growth framing = (number of “growth words” in the acquisition announcement/total num-
ber of words in the acquisition announcement) × 100.The illustrative example provided below
contains 6.25% dividend framing (= [3 dividend words/49 total words] × 100) and 4.17%
growth framing (= [2 growth words/49 total words] × 100) from our sample:
“We're pleased that this all-stock transaction offers NHP shareholders a premium
and also the opportunity to participate in the combined company's future prospects
for dividends and growth… The combined company will enjoy the stability of triple-
net lease assets and higher growth apartment-like cash flows from seniors housing
operating assets.” – Ventas Inc., 2011.
To ensure the validity of our two framing variables, we followed previously recommended pro-
cedures for content analysis when developing our dictionaries (Short, Broberg, Cogliser, &
Brigham, 2010). First, we identified words commonly used in academic and practitioner litera-
ture to refer to investors' expectations about firms with growth and dividend reputations
(e.g., Aghion & Stein, 2008; Benner, 2007; Benner & Ranganathan, 2013; Brealey et al., 2014).
We also verified the terms included in the two dictionaries with 34 academics specializing in
finance, most of whom invested in stocks and were very familiar with dividend and growth rep-
utations. Only words that were verified by at least 70% of these experts as relating unambigu-
ously and exclusively to ensuring dividend payments or firms' future growth were retained in
the final dictionaries (Short et al., 2010). To ensure a high reliability for our measure, we
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undertook computerized text analysis using the DICTION software, which produced a word
count for our various dividend and growth words and a total word count for each
announcement.
To further test the validity of our measures, we trained two PhD candidates to manually
code a random subsample of 115 acquisition announcements, which represented approximately
25% of our final sample. The coders rated the extent of dividend and growth framing in each
announcement on a three-point scale, where zero was “no framing,” one was “framing was
mentioned,” and two was “framing was emphasized” (Uotila, Maula, Keil, & Zahra, 2009). The
coders were provided with broad definitions for dividend framing and growth framing rather
than the actual dictionaries in order to prevent manual replication of the DICTION-generated
word counts used to compute our variables. The inter-rater reliability was high; 0.76 for divi-
dend framing and 0.70 for growth framing. The manually coded variables had a positive and
strong correlation with the framing variables used in this study, that is, 0.55 for the dividend
framing measures and 0.67 for the growth framing measures.
3.4 | Control variables
We controlled for a range of factors that might influence our results. Six variables controlled for
acquirer characteristics. Acquirer size was measured by the logarithm of the number of
employees. Acquirer cash flow was computed as: “(operating income – taxes - interest expense –
depreciation - common and preferred stock dividends)/common equity” (Graffin et al., 2016,
p. 243). We also controlled for acquirer ROA (return on assets) and acquisition experience, mea-
sured by the logarithm of the number of acquisitions made by the acquirer in the 3 years pre-
ceding a focal acquisition (Campbell et al., 2016). We further controlled for two acquirer
characteristics which might shape the acquirer's reputation for specific strategic activities, and
thus the investors' expectations of the acquirer; these characteristics were acquirers' engagement
in horizontal acquisitions and acquirers' restructuring efforts (Bergh, Johnson, & Dewitt, 2008;
Capron, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 2001). We measured the first as the logarithm of the number
of firms acquired by the acquirer over the previous 3 years that shared the same three-digit SIC
code as the acquirer (Capron et al., 2001). We measured the second as the logarithm of the
number of divestitures made by the acquirer in the 3 years preceding a focal acquisition (Bergh
et al., 2008). Finally, acquirer value creation reputation was included as a dummy variable,
which took the value of one if the acquirer was included in Fortune's Most Admired or the Wall
Street Journal and Harris Interactive's corporate reputation rankings, and zero otherwise
(Graffin et al., 2016).
We controlled for eight target firm characteristics that may affect abnormal stock returns to
acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016; Graffin et al., 2016). The first two of these are target size,
measured by the logarithm of the number of employees, and target ROA. Target relatedness was
the sum of primary relatedness and secondary relatedness. Primary relatedness took the value
of six, four or two respectively if there was a match between the acquirer and target firm in
terms of their primary SIC codes based on their four-, three-, and two-digit codes. Similarly, sec-
ondary relatedness took the value of three, two, or one if any of the secondary SIC codes mat-
ched based on the four-, three-, and two-digit SIC codes (Laamanen, Brauer, & Junna, 2014).
Thus, target relatedness took values of between zero and nine. Domestic target was coded as one
if the target was based in the United States, and zero otherwise. Private target was coded as one
for a private target firm, and zero otherwise. High-tech target took the value of one if the target's
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three-digit SIC code was 357, 365, 366, 367, 381, 382, 384, 386, 481, 482, 484, 489, or 737, and
zero otherwise (Li, Eden, Hitt, & Ireland, 2008). We also controlled for the characteristics of the
industry in which the target was operating. We regressed time on industry sales, based on the
three-digit SIC code of a target, for a period of 5 years, with the last year being the year before
the acquisition. Target industry dynamism was the SE of the regression coefficient used in the
regression, and target industry munificence was the regression coefficient itself, both scaled by
the average industry sales for the 5 years used in the regression (McNamara et al., 2008). Target
industry concentration was the combined market share of the four largest competitors in the tar-
get firm's industry.
We included four deal characteristics in our regression models following prior research,
namely deal value (logarithmically transformed); premium, which was the percentage difference
between the price per share paid by the acquirer for the target firm and the share price of the
target 1 week prior to the acquisition announcement; percentage of stock payment; and friendly
acquisition, coded as one if the acquisition was classified as friendly in SDC, and zero otherwise
(Campbell et al., 2016).
We also controlled for two more types of framing that could signal shareholder value creation
in acquisition announcements. First, we included shareholder value framing, measuring the num-
ber of references to “shareholder value” (or derived forms) relative to the total number of words
in the announcement calculated as a percentage (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Second, as the idea of strate-
gic fit could shift investors' interpretation of the acquisition as “good” or “bad” (Campbell
et al., 2016), we included strategic fit framing, this being measured as a percentage of the number
of references to “strategic fit” relative to the total number of words in the announcement.
Finally, we included the announcement length, measured as the logarithm of the number of
words used in the announcement, investor sentiment for the month prior to the acquisition
announcement, which we measured using an index developed and validated by Baker and
Wurgler (2006), and year dummies to rule out year-specific effects. Several outliers in terms of
the target firms' dividend and growth reputations and dividend and growth framing were
winsorized, but using the original values instead did not change our results.
3.5 | Estimation method
When estimating our models we accounted for possible selection bias, which could affect our
results for two reasons. First, there may be systemic differences between S&P 500 firms that
made acquisitions and those that did not. Second, firms with dividend or growth reputations
may have systemically different tendencies to make acquisitions. To correct for potential sample
selection bias, we used a Heckman two-stage estimation procedure (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, &
Semadeni, 2016). We constructed a sample of all S&P 500 companies for the period of our study
and identified whether they had made at least one acquisition during that period, as recorded
in the SDC Platinum database. In the first stage of the Heckman procedure, we ran a random-
effects probit regression predicting the likelihood of an acquisition while controlling for firm
and time effects. We used as an exclusion restriction the industry acquisition activity in the pre-
vious year, measured as the number of acquisitions made by firms within a specific three-digit
SIC code. Industry acquisition activity was an appropriate exclusion restriction for measuring
firms' tendencies to acquire, because firms tend to imitate their competitors' acquisitions, as
evidenced by acquisition waves (Haleblian, Kim, & Rajagopalan, 2006; McNamara et al., 2008).
As shown in Table A1, our instrument was positively associated with the likelihood of an
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acquisition (b = 0.001, p = .000). The weak correlations between the computed Inverse Mills
ratio and the two variables of interest—namely dividend reputation (r = −.11) and growth repu-
tation (r = −.03)—suggested that our exclusion restriction was of acceptable strength (Certo
et al., 2016). In the second stage, we tested all our hypotheses using OLS regression and
included the Inverse Mills ratio, which accounts for possible selection bias. We clustered SEs by
acquirers to account for multiple occurrences of some acquirers in our sample.
4 | RESULTS
The descriptive statistics and correlations are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the wide-
spread observation that acquisitions typically elicit lower abnormal stock returns for the
acquirer, we observed an average negative CAR (−1, 1) of −0.8%. The dividend and growth rep-
utations of acquirers (r = −.22) and those of target firms (r = −.07) were negatively and weakly
correlated, which is consistent with our conceptualization that these two reputations are dis-
tinct from each other but may coexist. Also, acquirers did not always select targets with reputa-
tions similar to theirs, nor did they attempt to frame acquisitions as being consistent with their
reputations. Indeed, the correlations between acquirer and target dividend reputations (r = .21)
as well as between acquirer's dividend reputation and dividend framing (r = .26) were relatively
weak. The correlations between acquirer's and target's growth reputations (r = .13), and
between acquirer's growth reputation and growth framing (r = −.03) were even weaker. Regard-
ing strategic framing, dividend framing was used in 173, growth framing in 406, and neither
type of framing in 48 announcements. The averages are 0.126% for dividend framing and
0.697% for growth framing, suggesting that acquirers used growth framing about five times
more than dividend framing.
The regression models predicting CAR (−1, 1) are presented in Table 2. The two indepen-
dent variables and moderators were mean-centered. All the variance inflation factors were
below 10, suggesting that multicollinearity did not affect our results. The Inverse Mills ratio did
not have a discernible effect on CAR in any of the models, indicating no evidence of potential
sample selection bias (Certo et al., 2016). Model 1 included the control and moderator variables.
Of those, deal value (b = −0.624, p = .010), percentage of stock payment (b = −0.015, p = .065)
and investor sentiment (b = 1.801, p = .063) predicted abnormal stock returns to the acquisition
announcement. Neither target reputations (btarget dividend reputation = 0.452, p = .341; btarget growth
reputation = 0.534, p = .213) nor strategic framing (bdividend framing = −0.287, p = .837; bgrowth
framing = 0.194, p = .602) had any material effect on CAR by themselves, which is consistent
with our theory that the way in which substantive and symbolic cues are interpreted by inves-
tors depends on the acquirer's reputation.
In Model 2, the acquirer's dividend and growth reputations were added to test Hypotheses (H1a)
and (H1b). Contrary to our predictions, the acquirer's dividend reputation was positively, not nega-
tively, associated with CAR (b = 0.707, p = .060). When an acquiring firm's dividend reputation
was strengthened by 1 SD (SD = 0.710), CAR increased by 0.50%, which represented an increase of
more than $240 million in monetary terms, given the $48.3 billion average market capitalization of
our sample firms. Consistent with our predictions, the acquirer's growth reputation was positively
associated with CAR (b = 1.083, p = .001). An increase of one standard deviation in the strength of
the acquirer's growth reputation (SD = 0.855) resulted in 0.93% increase in CAR, which for the
firms in our sample represented a boost of almost $450 million on the announcement of an acquisi-
tion. Overall, we found empirical support for Hypothesis (H1b) but not for Hypothesis (H1a).
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To test Hypotheses (H2a) and (H2b) we added to Model 3 the interaction terms between
acquirer's dividend reputation and target's growth reputation, and also between acquirer's growth
reputation and target's growth reputation. The coefficient for the interaction term between
acquirer's dividend reputation and target's growth reputation was negative and precisely estimated
(b = −1.464, p = .003). The coefficient for the interaction term between acquirer's growth reputation
and target's growth reputation was indistinguishable from zero (b = 0.641, p = .249). To illustrate
the moderation effect of target's growth reputation on the relationship between acquirer's dividend
reputation and CAR, in Figure 1, we plotted the corresponding slopes of acquirer's dividend reputa-
tion (between 2 SD below and above the mean) for strong (2 SD above the mean) and weak (2 SD
below the mean) values of the target's growth reputation.
The plot in Figure 1 provides valuable insights into the relationship between acquirer's dividend
reputation and CAR as predicted in Hypothesis (H1a). Although the test of this hypothesis revealed
that on average, there was not a negative association between acquirer's dividend reputation and
CAR, the plot in Figure 1 indicates such a negative association conditional to high levels of target
growth reputation. More specifically, the plot shows that acquirer's dividend reputation and CAR
were negatively associated, as predicted by Hypothesis (H1a), when target's growth reputation was
strong, but positively associated when target's growth reputation was weak. The point of inter-
section for the two slopes was 0.445 SD above the mean of the acquirer's dividend reputation. This
means that acquirers with a relatively strong dividend reputation (in our sample, acquirers who
paid more than $1.05 DPS) would generate higher stock market returns upon announcing an acqui-
sition if they selected a target with a weaker growth reputation. Overall, these findings provide par-
tial support for Hypothesis (H2a) and no support for Hypothesis (H2b).
We added in Model 4, the interaction terms between acquirer's dividend reputation and divi-
dend framing, as well as between acquirer's growth reputation and growth framing to test Hypothe-
ses (H3a) and (H3b). The coefficient for the interaction term between acquirer's dividend reputation
and dividend framing was positive and precisely estimated (b = 3.729, p = .012), as was the coeffi-
cient between acquirer's growth reputation and growth framing (b = 1.142, p = .015). To illustrate
our findings, we plotted the moderating effects in Figures 2 and 3. In each figure, we presented the
corresponding slopes for acquirers' growth and dividend reputations for high (2 SD above the mean)
and low (2 SD below the mean) values of the corresponding framing variables.
The plot in Figure 2 revealed that acquirer's dividend reputation and CAR were negatively
associated, as predicted by Hypothesis , when dividend framing was weak, but positively associ-
ated when dividend framing was strong. This suggests that the negative association between an
acquirer's dividend reputation and CAR as predicted in Hypothesis (H1a) is conditional on low
levels of dividend framing. The point of intersection between the two slopes was 0.882 SD above
the mean of acquirers' dividend reputation. This means that acquirers with a relatively strong
dividend reputation (in our sample, acquirers who paid more than $1.36 DPS) would generate
higher abnormal stock returns if they used high rather than low levels of dividend framing in
their acquisition announcements. These findings provided partial support to Hypothesis (H3a).
The plot in Figure 3 showed a slight negative association between acquirer's growth reputa-
tion and CARs when acquirers used low levels of growth framing in acquisition announcements,
and a strong positive association when they used high levels of growth framing. The point of
intersection between the two slopes was 0.311 SD below the mean of the acquirer's growth
reputation. This means that even acquirers with a relatively weak growth reputation (in our
sample, acquirers with sales growth of at least 20% over the 3 years preceding a focal acquisi-
tion) would generate abnormal stock returns by using high rather than low levels of growth
framing in their announcements. These findings provided support for Hypothesis (H3b).
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4.1 | Robustness tests for alternative measurements of dividend
and growth framing
We ran several robustness tests with alternative operationalizations of our dividend and growth
framing variables. First, we allowed for the possibility that words used in dividend and growth
framing might carry different weights with investors. The most salient words, which were “divi-
dend” for dividend framing and “growth” for growth framing, were given a weight of 1. The rest of
the words from the dividend and growth dictionaries were given a weight of 0.5. Using these
weighted framing measures yielded consistent results about the interaction effect between acquirer's
reputations and framing (bacquirer dividend reputation × weighted dividend framing = 5.226, p = .019; bacquirer
growth reputation × weighted growth framing = 1.380, p = .009). Second, we created dividend and growth
framing indices, which incorporated the depth and breadth of dividend and growth framing. The
depth was captured by our original measure. The breadth was meant to capture the variety of
dividend- and growth-related topics covered in each announcement, and was measured as the pro-
portion of words from the dividend and growth dictionaries used in each announcement to the total
number of words in the dividend and growth dictionaries respectively. The framing breadth and
depth measures were standardized and added together to create overall growth and dividend fram-
ing indexes. Using these measures also yielded consistent conclusions about the moderating effect
of framing on the association between acquirer's reputation and abnormal stock returns to acquisi-
tion announcements (bacquirer dividend reputation × dividend framing index = 0.402, p = .031; bacquirer growth
reputation × growth framing index = 0.252, p = .044).
4.2 | Robustness tests for the exogeneity of dividend and growth
framing
A potential concern for our hypothesis tests was whether our framing variables were exoge-
nous. To address this, we used a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression (Semadeni, Withers, &
Certo, 2014). In the first stage, we estimated dividend and growth framing in separate regres-
sions, using all control variables and carefully selected instruments. As an instrument for divi-
dend framing, we used the percentage of dividend-paying firms within the acquirer's three-digit
SIC code that cut their DPS in the year preceding the acquisition as dividend cuts by industry
peers are likely to predict decreases in the use of dividend framing (Brav et al., 2005). As an
instrument for growth framing, we used the 1-year sales growth rate for firms within the S&P
500 index for the quarter preceding the acquisition, because S&P 500 firms pay more attention
to each other than to their industry peers (Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov, & Yu, 2003). We
reported our results in Table A2. Our instruments for dividend framing (Model 1: b = −0.018,
p = .047) and growth framing (Model 2: b = 2.625, p = .006) were strong predictors of the
respective framing variables, and thus satisfied the selection criteria. In the second stage of our
2SLS regression, we predicted CAR using all the control variables, the framing variable of inter-
est, and the corresponding framing residual from the first-stage regression. We performed the
Durbin–Wu–Hausman (DWH) test to assess the precision of the coefficient of the first-stage
framing residuals in the second-stage regression, and to check therefore whether dividend and
growth framing were in fact exogenous. If the coefficient for the residuals was indistinguishable
from zero, the estimates from OLS could be deemed consistent and we should not correct any
further for endogeneity (Semadeni et al., 2014). We did not find evidence of endogeneity
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regarding dividend (DWH = 1.122, p = .263) or growth framing (DWH = −0.699, p = .486),
meaning that the results in Table 2 are unbiased and consistent.
5 | DISCUSSION
We built a contingency model that distinguishes between an acquirer's dividend and
growth reputation to better understand why and under what circumstances investors may
react positively or negatively to an acquisition announcement. We found that an acquisi-
tion generates more positive abnormal returns not only when an acquirer has a growth
reputation, but also when it has a dividend reputation. In addition, we showed that sub-
stantive and symbolic cues influence the interpretative processes of investors in such a
way that investors ultimately reinforce or revise their initial opinions about an acquisi-
tion by a firm with a dividend or a growth reputation. Overall, our findings have impor-
tant implications for research on investors' reactions to acquisitions and on EVT and
impression management.
FIGURE 1 Interaction effect of acquirer's
dividend reputation and target's growth reputation on
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
FIGURE 2 Interaction effect of acquirer's
dividend reputation and dividend framing on
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR)
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5.1 | Theoretical implications
First, our work provides important implications for our understanding of investors' varied reactions
to acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016; Schijven & Hitt, 2012). Although earlier studies have argued
almost exclusively that acquisitions violate the expectations of investors, and have therefore
suggested that investors typically react negatively to acquisition announcements (Graffin
et al., 2016), few have examined the underlying reasons why investors may react positively to acqui-
sitions, and the circumstances in which they do so (Campbell et al., 2016). Moreover, earlier work
on investors' reactions to acquisitions has assumed that their perceptions of the value of acquisitions
are similar for particular groups of firms, such as those with a high reputation (Haleblian
et al., 2017). Our framework, however, offers a more nuanced perspective on investors' expectations
and their reactions to acquisitions by showing that investors do not universally perceive acquisitions
as negative expectancy violations because of their ambiguous outcomes (Haleblian et al., 2009).
Rather, perceived expectancy violations arising from acquisitions may vary because the specific
ways in which an acquirer has created shareholder value in the past give rise to different expecta-
tions. More specifically, when firms are known for distinct ways of creating shareholder value, this
shapes the evaluative processes of investors in such a way that, for some acquiring firms, they may
not only consider an acquisition to be a superior vehicle for generating value over time but may also
downplay the potential downside of allocating resources to acquisitions. This implies that varied
expectations about subsets of firms need to be taken into account in order to bring together both
negative as well as positive predictions of EVT in the context of acquisitions (Campbell et al., 2016).
While our results show that, on average, firms' dividend reputation leads to positive reactions from
investors, rather than to the negative reactions we predicted, we found that the positive effect of firms'
growth reputation on investor reactions is muchmore precisely estimated than that of dividend repu-
tation. Our findings also reveal that investors' reactions become negative when the target firm has a
growth reputation, andwhen dividend framing is not used strongly in the acquisition announcement.
Taken together, these results are consistent with our conceptual framework as well as with prior
research on reputation. More specifically, these findings suggest that, as any type of reputation, divi-
dend reputation leads investors to give managers “the benefit of the doubt” (Zavyalova et al., 2016),
but only up to a certain point. That is, despite the potential negative impact of acquisitions on divi-
dends, investors do not perceive all acquisitions of firms with a dividend reputation as a negative
expectancy violation. Rather, the perception of a negative expectancy violation is contingent on the
nature of substantive and symbolic information cues that investors process in conjunction with an
FIGURE 3 Interaction effect of acquirer's growth
reputation and growth framing on cumulative
abnormal returns (CAR)
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acquirer's dividend reputation. Specifically, such perception manifests itself when investors observe
acquiring firms internalizing new capabilities that they perceive to be incompatiblewith the perpetua-
tion of dividends, as implied by the growth reputation of target firms, and when acquirers fail to
explain to investors how the acquisition is intended to enhance dividends. Overall, these findings sup-
port our contention that firms' growth and dividend reputations give rise to different expectations
from investors by revealing important boundary conditions of EVT.
Second, by examining how both substantive and symbolic information cues shape the evaluative
processes underlying investors' reactions to acquisitions, we contribute to newly emerging work on
the intersection between EVT and research on impression management (Graffin et al., 2016; Rhee &
Fiss, 2014). While earlier studies have focused only on how firms may offset negative expectancy vio-
lations by providing symbolic cues to stakeholders, we show that both substantive and symbolic cues
influence investors' perceptions of expectancy violations, albeit in different ways. Specifically, while
symbolic cues in terms of dividend and growth framing influence investors' interpretations of an
acquisition as either a positive or a negative expectancy violation, substantive cues regarding a target's
growth reputation only affect perceptions of negative expectancy violations. This suggests that inves-
tors take much less account of substantive cues when interpreting an acquisition as a positive expec-
tancy violation—for example, when both the acquiring and the target firm have a growth reputation.
This implies that, to better understand the boundary conditions of EVT in explaining reactions to neg-
ative and positive expectancy violations, scholars should differentiate between the influence of sub-
stantive and symbolic cues. Specifically, insights about the role of substantive cues in the context of
negative expectancy violations may not be readily extendable to situations in which the goal is to
explain their influence on interpretative processes pertaining to positive expectancy violations.
Moreover, most research on strategic framing has been done in contexts that involve unam-
biguously negative events (e.g., Elsbach, 1994; Zavyalova et al., 2012). This exclusive focus on
negative events has limited our understanding of how framing affects a broader range of per-
ceived expectancy violations. By focusing on acquisitions, which can be interpreted both posi-
tively and negatively, we are able to demonstrate that framing can be effectively used not only
to attenuate perceptions of negative expectancy violations, but also to reinforce perceptions of
positive expectancy violations. This suggests that framing could be a more powerful impression
management tool for mangers than previously indicated.
Our findings also have implications for broader research on impression management. Even
though scholars have examined how firm characteristics may encourage the use of impression
management (Gamache et al., 2019; Graffin et al., 2016), they have not considered the implica-
tions of such characteristics for the effectiveness of the impression management per se. Instead,
they have focused on identifying impression management techniques and the usage of frames
in general (Fiss & Zajac, 2006; Pan, McNamara, Lee, Haleblian, & Devers, 2018). Our findings,
however, show that growth and dividend framing do not have a direct effect on how investors
evaluate acquisitions, but rather shape the interpretative processes of investors in conjunction
with the acquirer's specific reputation for value creation.
5.2 | Practical implications
Our findings have important implications for investors and managers. We found that investors
evaluated acquisitions differently, depending on the way a company created shareholder
value—either through dividends (dividend reputation) or through capital gains (growth reputa-
tion). Investors seemed to favor acquisitions made by acquirers with a growth reputation, and
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rewarded them almost twice as much as acquisitions made by those with a dividend reputation,
likely due to their past success in generating exponential growth. However, past success does
not necessarily guarantee that all decisions will bring similar success in the future (Chan &
Lakonishok, 2004). We therefore urge investors to be aware of such biases and to evaluate
acquisitions by high-growth firms on their own merits.
Our findings also underscore the importance of the framing being consistent with the
acquirer's dividend or growth reputation. Hence, we encourage firms that are announcing an
acquisition to provide explicit information to investors regarding how the acquisition is
intended to create additional value for shareholders, taking into account the current dividend
and/or growth reputation of their firm. In addition, our findings reveal that investors might
penalize firms with a dividend reputation when they acquire a target with a growth reputation.
As such, we urge firms with a dividend reputation to weigh up the potential benefits and draw-
backs before deciding to acquire a high-growth target.
5.3 | Limitations and directions for future research
Our findings provide valuable opportunities for future research. For instance, we have shown that
looking at firms' growth and dividend reputations has the potential to enrich our understanding of
how external audiences interpret firms' actions. However, firms can have multiple reputations,
including for being diversified or focused, environmentally friendly, or high-technology oriented.
Those multiple reputations might lead to fuzziness in the minds of audiences as to what might be
expected of the firm (Parker et al., 2019). Therefore, a fruitful next step would be to study how audi-
ences integrate and prioritize their expectations when they evaluate firms' initiatives.
Due to the nature of our research question, we focused on the consequences rather than the
antecedents of framing. Specifically, we were not able to differentiate between framing that was
used as an impression management technique, and framing that was the product of managerial
sense-making efforts. Given that research has suggested both of these are possible
(Kaplan, 2008), a useful venue for future research would be to differentiate between the two,
and to investigate the implications of this distinction for the effectiveness of framing. We hope
our theory and analyses will stimulate further research on how investors form their perceptions
about acquisitions and on contingencies that shape these perceptions.
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APPENDIX A.
TABLE A1 Heckman first-stage
model predicting the likelihood of an
acquisition
Variables
Industry acquisition activity 0.0006 [0.0001]
Firm dividend reputation 0.0027 [0.0446]
Firm growth reputation 0.0677 [0.0291]
Firm size 0.1421 [0.0329]
Firm cash flow 0.0740 [0.0321]
Firm ROA 2.2178 [0.3677]
Firm restructuring efforts 0.0584 [0.0301]
Firm value-creation reputation −0.0110 [0.1456]
Investor sentiment 0.5355 [0.1291]
Constant −1.2018 [0.1433]
Year dummies Yes
Log pseudolikelihood −3,836.94
Wald Chi-square (p-value) 139.60 (.00)
Note: N = 7,071 firm-year observations. n = 614 number of firms. SEs
clustered on the firm are given in brackets. All predictors are lagged by
1 year.
TABLE A2 First-stage 2SLS models testing for endogeneity of dividend and growth framing
Dependent variable Dividend framing Growth framing
Variables Model 1 Model 2
Percentage of dividend-cutting firms in acquirer's industry −0.0184 [0.0092]
1-Year sales growth rate for firms within the S&P 500 2.6253 [0.9374]
Acquirer dividend reputation 0.0757 [0.0205] −0.0434 [0.0350]
Acquirer growth reputation 0.0077 [0.0123] −0.0095 [0.0259]
Target dividend reputation 0.0107 [0.0306] −0.1201 [0.0479]
Target growth reputation −0.0221 [0.0200] 0.1455 [0.0442]
Acquirer size −0.0265 [0.0161] −0.0013 [0.0312]
Acquirer cash flow −0.0182 [0.0102] −0.0475 [0.0344]
Acquirer ROA −0.2386 [0.2091] −0.3266 [0.5219]
Acquisition experience −0.0426 [0.0177] −0.0685 [0.0327]
Engagement in horizontal acquisitions 0.0086 [0.0153] −0.0149 [0.0345]
Acquirer restructuring efforts 0.0216 [0.0117] −0.0194 [0.0305]
Acquirer value-creation reputation −0.0552 [0.0299] −0.0188 [0.0784]
Target size 0.0260 [0.0103] −0.0188 [0.0250]
Target ROA 0.0086 [0.0149] 0.0399 [0.0384]
Related target −0.0001 [0.0035] −0.0290 [0.0078]
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TABLE A2 (Continued)
Dependent variable Dividend framing Growth framing
Domestic target −0.0175 [0.0355] 0.2205 [0.0690]
Private target −0.0126 [0.0796] 0.4418 [0.2764]
High-tech target 0.0347 [0.0262] 0.0157 [0.0550]
Target industry dynamism 0.0554 [0.7188] 1.1287 [1.6047]
Target industry munificence −0.1289 [0.1898] 0.0621 [0.4040]
Target industry concentration 0.0357 [0.0676] −0.1190 [0.1451]
Deal value 0.0124 [0.0116] 0.0774 [0.0242]
Premium −0.0177 [0.0241] 0.0042 [0.0706]
Percentage of stock payment 0.0006 [0.0003] −0.0001 [0.0007]
Friendly acquisition −0.0939 [0.1865] 0.5302 [0.1045]
Shareholder value framing 0.3112 [0.1483] 0.3965 [0.2955]
Strategic fit framing −0.2014 [0.1165] −0.1141 [0.4900]
Announcement length −0.0026 [0.0220] 0.0225 [0.0405]
Investor sentiment 0.0396 [0.0347] −0.1231 [0.0902]
Inverse Mills ratio −0.0169 [0.0835] −0.1437 [0.2019]
Constant 0.0146 [0.2715] −1.2298 [0.3651]
Year dummies Yes Yes
R2 .30 .25
F-test for excluded instruments (p-value) 3.99 (.05) 7.84 (.01)
DWH endogeneity test (p-value) 1.12 (.26) −0.70 (.47)
Note: N = 462. SEs clustered on the acquirer are given in brackets. Variables relating to framing and to the acquiring and target
firms' growth and dividend reputations are centered.
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